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Abstract 
We use non-random sorting into interethnic marriage and salient differences between 
Sephardic and Ashkenazi surnames to evaluate the causal impact of Sephardic affiliation on 
wages. Using the 1995 Israeli Census, we estimate the effect of a Sephardic affiliation on 
wages. We first compare the wages of Israeli Jewish males born to Sephardic fathers and 
Ashkenazi mothers (SA), who are more likely to carry a Sephardic surname, with the wages 
of Israeli Jewish males born to Ashkenazi fathers and Sephardic mothers (AS). We find that 
SA workers earn significantly less than their AS counterparts. We then exploit the custom of 
women to adopt their husbands. surnames to disentangle actual ethnicity from the ethnicity 
perceived by the market. Consistent with our interpretation of the results for males, we find 
that it is father-in-law’s ethnicity - rather than father’s ethnicity - that shapes female wage 
rates, yet only for daughters of interethnic couples and others with mild skin tone who have 
equal chances to be perceived either as an Ashkenazi or as a Sephardic group member. 
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I Introduction
Half a century after Beckers (1957) seminal work on the economics of discrimination and
decades after the pioneering work by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) on theories of statistical
discrimination and its self-conrming e¤ects (Loury, 1977, 1981),1 it is well recognized that
ethnic diversity has profound and far-reaching implications for social welfare and economic
outcomes, both within societies - by a¤ecting the relative economic outcomes of di¤erent
groups - and between economies - by inuencing national rates of economic growth (Easterly
and Levine, 1997).
Identifying the presence of labor market discrimination and evaluating its impact on
earnings, however, faces several major obstacles. It involves separating skill di¤erences and
personal choices from prejudice and stereotyping. Ideally, we would like to compare outcomes
of individuals who are identical in all respects except in how labor markets perceive their
ethnicity. One approach is to use measures of academic achievement and learning aptitude
to account for premarket factors (e.g., Neal and Johnson, 1996). But, this approach might
fail to approximate the ceteris paribus conditions; because these individual traits might
themselves reect the impact of discrimination (Altonji and Blank, 1999, Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov, 2005).
Audit studies are an alternative approach to identify discrimination. Using paired testers
who di¤er only in their perceived race, audit studies attempt to control for systematic dif-
ferences across groups. Because of the di¢ culties associated with forming identical pairs,
recent studies in the labor market context, used ctitious resumes with distinctively ethnic
names to manipulate employersperceptions of race. This is a very powerful approach for
measuring discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) in terms of receiving a job
interview among a randomly selected sample of rms, but it might not provide a complete
measure of discrimination in the overall labor market, as suggested by Becker (1957) and
Heckman (1998).2
In this paper we o¤er a di¤erent approach. We take advantage of the ethnic-origin-related
genealogy of family names passed from father to o¤spring and the fact that marriages are not
random, but rather exhibit strong sorting patterns along many attributes, to approximate
a ceteris paribus experiment and evaluate the causal impact of discrimination on wages in
observational data. We compare the wages of individuals who, we will argue, are similar in
1This early work was followed by Durlauf (1996) and Benabou (1996), who emphasized the feedback
impact of pre-labor market discrimination on the accumulation of human capital by future generations, and
also Coate and Loury (1993), who studied the implications of statistical discrimination through self-fullling
prophecies when information is imperfect.
2Goldin and Rouse (2000) isolate the importance of gender preference in a market-like setting for sex-
biased hiring.
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all respects that are relevant for labor market performance and di¤er only in how the market
perceives their ethnicity, as signaled by their inherited ethnic-sounding family names.
The Israeli Jewish societywhich is composed of two major ethnic groups with distinct
geo-cultural originsprovides a natural laboratory for identifying the degree of ethnic wage
discrimination. Ashkenazim are the dominant socio-economic group in Israel. The Ashke-
nazim are of Northern and Eastern European descent ("Ashkenaz" meaning "Germany"
in Medieval Hebrew). In contrast, the Sephardim primarily have Spanish, Portuguese, or
Northern African origins ("Sepharad" meaning "Spain" or "Iberia" in Hebrew).3
On average, the Ashkenazi have experienced greater socio-economic success than Sephardic
Jews in Israel despite religious similarities, integration through the educational system, joint
military service and "collective consciousness," as well as genetic similarities between Ashke-
nazi and Sephardic Jews (Behar et al. 2006; Owens and King, 1999). These disparities exist
in educational attainment (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1991; Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998),
earnings (Haberfeld and Cohen, 2007), juvenile delinquency and adult criminal involvement
(Fishman et al., 1987; Ajzenstadt and Borowski, 2005). By the late 1990s, half a century
after the establishment of the state of Israel, the Sephardic-Ashkenazi wage gaps had be-
come as large as the black-white wage gaps in the United States as reported by Altonji and
Blank (1999), e.g., about 12 percent after conditioning on education, potential experience,
and other demographics.
For the purposes of this paper, the major distinguishing characteristic between Ashke-
nazim and Sephardim is their surname: the ethnic-related genealogy of family names signals
to labor markets whether a person is Ashkenazi or Sephardic. Today, Jewish family names
in Israel are typically either Sephardic or Ashkenazi.
Moreover, and critically for this paper, surname also shapes whether labor markets per-
ceive Israelis born to interethnic parents as Sephardic or Ashkenazi. The vast majority of
marriages are within the "Ashkenazi" and the "Sephardic" groups (Goldscheider, 2002), so
that a persons last name is still a fairly accurate signal of the ethnic origins of both a per-
sons mother and father.4 Consequently, labor markets tend to use surname as a signal of
3Israel can be described most succinctly as dual (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986) on two levels: Israeli
Jews and Israeli Arabs, and, within the Jewish population, "Ashkenazim" and "Sephardim." In modern
Israeli Hebrew, the term "Sephardim" typically refers to Jews of Arabic or Persian descent, whereas, the
term "Ashkenazim" refers to descendants of Jews from Germany, Poland and Austria and is often applied
to all Jews of European background living in Israel. For religious practice, Jews of these communities
are considered to be "Sephardim", meaning "Jews of the Spanish rite", or, Ashkenazim, meaning "Jews
of the German rite", whether or not their families actually originate in Spain or Germany, respectively.
Consequently, the two ethnic groups tend to use di¤erent international "Jewish" languages, with Ashkenazim
typically speaking "Yiddish" and Sephardic "Ladino."
4The proportion of intra group marriages dropped slightly over time from 93% to 86% in 1995 (according
to the 1972 and the 1995 census).
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ethnic a¢ liation. For people who are indistinguishable in all other respects, it is the ethnic-
related genealogy of the family name that shapes how the labor market perceives a persons
ethnicity.
Using the Israeli Census of 1995, the rst to contain both fathers and mothers country of
birth, we attempt to approximate a ceteris paribus experiment - that is varying the markets
perception of a persons ethnicity while keeping all other factors constant - by comparing the
log hourly wages of male workers born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers (hereafter
SA) with the wages of males born to Ashkenazi fathers and Sephardic mothers (hereafter
AS).
The structural interpretation of the wage gaps in this benchmark empirical setting rests
on the assumption that individuals born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers are
similar to, if not better than, their Ashkenazi-Sephardic counterparts in all respects that are
relevant to labor market performance. The only di¤erence is in their propensity to carry a
Sephardic sounding family.
This is not a trivial assumption. While children of interethnic unions are presumably
indistinguishable in terms of physical attributes from those of single ethnic unions, regardless
of the nature of sorting into interethnic marriages, family environment and child-raising
habits that are central to the formation of skills and personal traits are not exogenous to
the patterns of the interethnic mating. Specically, in a society in which being Sephardic is
viewed as a negative cultural trait, one may wonder which types of Ashkenazi women marry
Sephardic men. And even if pairing into mixed unions was random, children in AS families
may also enjoy better home environments than those of the SA, since the Ashkenazim have on
average stronger socioeconomic characteristics than the Sephardim. These and other factors
raise concerns as to whether children from SA families enjoy similar home environments and
parental inuences, either via nature or by nurture, than children from AS families.
We utilize the economics and sociology of marriage and a rich set of measures of home
environments and early achievement to address conceptually and evaluate empirically these
concerns.
A considerable body of research indicates that marriages are not random. Rather, mar-
riages exhibit strong sorting along many attributes, such that people tend to marry others
with very similar socio-economic characteristics (Becker, 1981; Qian, 1997). The leading
theories in economics (Becker, 1981) and sociology (Merton, 1941; Blau 1964) of intermar-
riage among ethnic and racial groups predict that Ashkenazim must be compensated for
their higher social status by intermarrying with Sephardim with other comparably valuable
traits. Although this earlier literature does not provide predictions on whether the AS or the
SA pairings will have, on average, stronger socioeconomic traits, recent studies report that
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women have a stronger preference for the income and ethnicity of their partner than vice
versa (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010). Therefore, while Sephardic men might not be
able to draw women from the very right tail of the Ashkenazi "talent" distribution, highly-
educated, economically successful Sephardic menmay be especially attractive to other women
with strong preferences for human capital (and income). And the less "talented" Ashkenazi
men should have a comparative advantage among women with strong tastes for perceived
Ashkenazi ethnicity. In this scenario we expect children of SA parents to be similar to, if not
better than, their AS peers in all respects that are relevant to labor market performance.
Econometrically, our main identifying assumption is that the bias on the unobservables
is in the same direction as the bias on the observables. The assumption rests on the insight,
formulated in Altonji Elder and Taber (2005), that when the observed variables are a random
sub-set of all factors that determine wages than the bias on the unobservables is the same
as the bias on the observables.
We present a wide array of evidence that both supports the validity of our identifying
assumption and suggests that the data are biased in favor of nding that children from
SA parents will earn more than their counterparts from AS parents. That is, measures of
family background, cognitive skills, cultural preferences, educational attainments and social
networks indicate that the contrast between those born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi
mothers (SA), the "treatment group," and their "Ashkenazi-Sephardic" counterparts (AS),
the "comparison group," provide a conservative setting for estimating the causal e¤ect of
perceived ethnic a¢ liation, as signaled by family name, on wages. We nd that both parents
of SA children have higher levels of education and earn more than their AS counterparts.
SA children were raised in higher-status communities than their AS peers and have the same
number of siblings. It is thus no surprise to nd that children of SA parents do better on
cognitive achievement tests and achieves better educational credentials as their AS peers.
To the extent that religious practices might proxy for latent child-raising habits, norms,
traditions and beliefs that are not reected in academic achievements, we nd that fathers,
mothers and sons in SA families are as secular as their AA peers, the elite group, and less
orthodox than their AS peers and Sephardic men in SS unions. Thus, the data suggest that
SA are similar to, if not better than, their AS peers, so that any correlation between parents
origin and unobserved factors that a¤ect wages will tend to create a bias against nding that
AS individuals earn more than their SA peers.
We nd that Israeli prime age full-time full-year AS males earn between 7 to 11 per-
cent more than their SA counterparts. This gap in wages cannot be attributed either to
educational attainment, location of residence, or sorting into better paying occupations and
Industries. Accounting for location of residency, occupations and industries xed e¤ects, we
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nd a larger log residual wage gap between AS and SA workers and the magnitude of this
AS-SA residual wage gap is very similar to that between workers born to purely Ashkenazi
and purely Sephardic parents (hereafter, AA and SS respectively).
Next, we utilize the common tradition in the Jewish culture, (and others too) for women
to adopt their husbands last names upon marriage, to put a wedge between a womans
perceived ethnicity, as inferred by labor markets, and her actual ethnic origin. While parents
origin determines a womans ethnicity, it is her father-in-laws surname that is observed by
labor markets. If the perceived ethnic a¢ liation matters, married womens wages should
reect their father-in-laws origin, rather than their own ethnicity.
Consistent with our interpretation that labor markets discriminate based on perceived
ethnicity, we nd that it is father-in-laws ethnicity - rather than the ethnicity of the womans
own father - that matters for a womans earnings. Remarkably similar patterns to those
obtained among men are found when the population of married women is classied by fathers
and fathers-in-laws ethnicity rather than their parentsorigin.
We go further by distinguishing among people where surname is a better - or worse -
signal of ethnicity. Conceptually, a persons surname should shape the markets perception
of ethnicity more when there are no other informative signals about ethnicity. If the labor
market can condently discern a persons ethnicity through other means, such as skin tones,
then surname should be less useful in explaining earnings di¤erentials. To accomplish this,
we obtain information on skin tones, since the Ashkenazi originate from more northern areas
than the Sephardic. Despite sharing an origin point, Ashkenazi Jews often are lighter in
skin, eye color and hair than the Sephardim. This diversity reects intermingling with the
populations among which Jews have lived.
We nd that when the market can distinguish ethnicity through skin tone, then surname
matters less for accounting for wage di¤erences between the children of SA and AS parents.
Specically, we estimate the impact of fathers-in-laws ethnicity on prime aged women born
to AS and SA families. We nd that the e¤ect of perceived ethnicity among women to be
of the same order of magnitude found among men. The sub-set of the population with mild
skin tone is not limited to women born to AS or SA parents. Even within AA and SS tone
color might vary by country of origin. We use Von Luschans chromatic scale and parents
country of origin to assign a skin tone to each person, which equals to the average skin color
of the representative persons in her parents countries of origin.5 We re-estimate the impact
of fathersand fathers-in-laws ethnicity separately for women with mild skin tones and for
all others. We nd fathers-in-laws ethnicity matters, at similar magnitude to those obtained
5One of the earliest rigorous quantitative classications of skin tone degree is the Von Luschans chromatic
scale method.
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for SA, yet only among women with mild skin tones. We obtain similar ndings for men.
Our study is not the rst to use distinctively minority-sounding names to separate skill
di¤erences from race and ethnicity. While eld experiments found that resumes with tradi-
tional names are substantially more likely to lead to job interviews than identical resumes
with distinctively minority-sounding names (Jowell and Prescott-Clarke, 1970; Brown and
Gay, 1985; Bart et al., 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), Fryer and Levitt (2004b)
found no evidence that proxies for pay are worse for those with ethnic names after control-
ling for background characteristics. Further, we are not the rst to utilize ethnic-sounding
names in the Israeli context. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found systematic mistrust to-
ward Sephardic Jews, in a set of laboratory experiments in which Sephardic and Ashkenazi
sounding-names were employed to signal ethnicity. Finally we are not the rst to integrate
name labels to examine discrimination with observational data. Recently, Arai and Thoursie
(2009) have found that immigrants to Sweden earned substantially more after they volun-
tarily abandoned their foreign-sounding names.
Yet, our study is the rst to o¤er a setting that utilizes name labels to approximate
the ceteris paribus conditions with observational data. Although name label studies are
intuitively appealing, their interpretation is controversial. A distinctive choice of a name
might be "primarily a consequence rather than a cause" of economic success (Fryer and
Levitt, 2004b, page 801). Similarly, a name change is exogenous neither to investment
in human capital nor to formation of social networks. By focusing on the labor market
outcomes of individuals born to interethnic unions and among people with neither too light
nor too dark skin tones for whom surname is a credible signal of ethnicity our research
designs approximate ceteris paribus experiments. These experiments enable comparison of
wages among individuals who are similar in all respects that inuence wages, except for in
their perceived ethnicity (as signaled by ethnic-sounding family names). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst paper to incorporate the insight that name labels manipulate
perception when ethnic names sound credible to identify the causal impact of perceived
ethnicity in observational data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of
ethnic diversity within Israeli Jewish society and describes the data. Section III lays out the
econometric framework and identifying assumptions. Section IV presents evidence on family
environment and academic achievements to assess the validity of the SA-AS treatment-
comparison group setting. In section V, we report the estimated impact of Sephardic af-
liation on mens wages. Sections VI and VII utilize the gender-specic linkage between
father and father-in-laws ethnicity to further evaluate the impact of ethnic discrimination
on womens wages. Section VIII concludes.
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II Background and Data
Ethnicity is a central dimension of Israeli society. In this paper we focus on the segmentation
within Israeli society between Jews of European or American descent and Jews of Asian or
African origin.
II.a Ethnicity and Migration to Israel
Ashkenazi Jews were the rst Jews to settle in Israel, and they came mainly from Eastern
European countries. Most Sephardic Jews arrived after Israel achieved statehood and came
mainly from Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa. During the 1990s
Israel experienced mass migration from the former USSR following the collapse of the "Iron
Curtain". By the mid-1990s, about half of the Israeli Jews aged 22 to 65 were born in Israel,
the vast majority of whom were born to parents who immigrated to Israel.
II.b Economic and Social Ethnic Gaps
A large body of research documents persistent ethnic-related gaps among Israeli-born Jews on
many indicators of social welfare, including educational attainment, (Semyonov and Lewin-
Epstein, 1991; Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998; Dahan et al 2003) earnings (Haberfeld and
Cohen, 2007), juvenile delinquency, and adult criminal involvement (Fishman et al., 1987;
Ajzenstadt, 2005). While the poor outcomes of rst generation of Sephardim immigrants
have often been attributed to low levels of economic development in their source countries
(Eisenstadt, 1954; Shuval 1963; Semyonov and Lerhental, 1991) or lack of personal ties with
those who controlled resources (Semyonov and Tyree, 1981), the socioeconomic gaps among
the second generation (Amir, 1987; Mark 1994; Yitchaki and Schechtman, 2009) and the
third generation are challenging and intriguing.6
Ethnic segregation within the Israeli Jewish population is also reected outside labor
markets. As in the United States, neighborhoods segregated by ethnic origin are not limited
to immigrants, and most marriages are within ethnic groups (Goldscheider, 2002).7 It is thus
not surprising to nd that ethnicity is one of the top characteristics on the popular Jewish
singles network JDate.com.
6For details, see web appendix
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/9682736/Web%20Appendix/WEB24NOV2012.pdf
7The proportion of inter-ethnic couples increased from 7 to 14 percent points between 1970 and 1995.
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II.c Surnames and Ethnicity
Family names are of great importance in Judaism, as they often indicate a persons genealogy
or origin of family (Kagano¤, 1977). Among Sephardic Jews, a surname may be derived from
a persons hometown, as Toledano (from Toledo), Alfasi (from Fez), Mizrahi (from the east),
or Levanti (from the Levant). They may also be derived from the name of an important
ancestor, or even refer to historical gures such as King David (Ibn Daoud is son of David).
A common prex is Ibn, which means son in Arabic; thus, Ibn Malka is "the son of Malka"
(queen), and a person who carries the name Ibn Shaltiel is a descendent of Shaltiel.
Most Ashkenazi last names are derived from three sources. The rst is genealogy:
Aharonson is the son of Aharon, Abramson is son of Abram, and so on. The second source is
historical residence, such as Rotenberg (family from Rotenberg). The third source is personal
characteristics, such as Gross (Large), Klein (small), Weiss (white).8 Personal characteris-
tics also include professions historically common to the family, e.g., Schneider (tailor) and
Kaufman (merchant).
Generally speaking, Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews have di¤erent and distinct names.
The only exceptions are probably Cohen and Levi, which are carried by persons of both
groups.9 By the early 2000s, the vast majority of common Jewish family names in Israel
were either Sephardic (e.g., Mizrachi, Peretz, Biton, Dahan, Azulai, Gabai, Amar, Ochion,
Chadad/Hadad, Ben-David, Adrei) or Ashkenazi (Friedman, Katz, Levin).
II.d Data
To evaluate the impact of ethnic a¢ liation on pay, we draw on the 20 percent public-use
Israeli Census of 1995, which is the rst to contain both fathersand motherscountries of
birth (for those born in Israel).
We also use data taken from the public-use micro les from the 1972, 1983 and the linked
1983-1995 sample of the Israeli censuses. The 1972 and 1983 samples provide supplementary
information on home environment, including parental education and fathers occupation.
The linked 1983-1995 gives panel evidence on changes in womens wage following their mar-
riage outside of their ethnic group. We complement the Census data with the Life History
Study of Israeli Men (LHSIM), a stratied national probability sample of Jewish Israeli men
8These were sometimes given by authorities to Jews as a way of mockery. For example Reichman, which
means rich man, to a poor man.
9The mapping from individualssurnames to their ethnicity is not one-to-one. For various reasons, such as
being an o¢ cial representative of the Israeli state, due to marriage or potentially as reaction to discrimination,
some Israelis adopt a Hebrew surname (Hebraization). These changes were mostly done by either of the
following methods: (1) phonetic similarity (2) translation (3) adoption of a common rst name (4) names of
locations in Israel.
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born in 1954, which contains information on cognitive ability and religious practice (summary
statistics are available on Table A3).
Data sets do not provide self-reported ethnic a¢ liation. Therefore, the Israeli Jewish
population is often classied into ethnic groups by a persons country of birth or, for Israeli-
born, by their parentscountry of birth. Our main analysis focuses on Israeli-born Jews.
These are classied into four subgroups: (i) both parents were born in either Europe or
America (AA); (ii) both parents were born in either Asia or Africa (SS); (iii) father was born
in either Europe or America and mother was born in either Asia or Africa (AS); and (iv)
father was born in either Asia or Africa and mother was born in either Europe or America
(SA). About 4 percent of the population aged 25 to 65 are o¤spring of interethnic unions
(Figure 1).
In our main wage analyses, for men and women, we focus on prime aged, 30 to 55
years of age, full-time (at least 35 work hours per week), full-year (12 month) workers
(hereafter FTFY), who worked the entire month for which salary is reported. We trim wage
outliers when calculating mean wages by excluding the bottom and top one percentile of
the salaried Jewish male FTFY workers in the wage distribution. The appendix provides
detailed information on each one of the data sets and the corresponding summary statistics.
III The Empirical Setting
III.a The Statistical Model
We illustrate formally our empirical strategy with the following statistical model. Let Yi
denote the log hourly wage of person i. Let Ni equal to one if person i possesses a Sephardic
surname and zero otherwise. All other things equal, wages are determined by persons
perceived ethnicity as signaled by their surnames. In the context of our study, outcomes
are determined by whether person i possesses a Sephardic surname (Ni = 1) assuming that,
ethnic-sounding names serve as a valid signal of ethnicity. We assume that log of hourly
wages are given by a linear-in-the-parameters specication:
Yi = Ni +Wi; (1)
where Wi = X
0
i+ "i and W is the full set of variables (observed X and unobserved ") other






= 0, where " represents
all idiosyncratic person-specic inuences on wages, including person-specic returns on N .
The parameter of interest  measures the local causal e¤ect of a Sephardic surname on wages
among individuals who have equal chances to be perceived by employers as an Ashkenazi or
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a Sephardic.
People choose whether to carry their fathers surname to maximize their utility. If labor
markets use surnames as a signal for ethnicity, then it might be costly to have an ethnic-
sounding surname (Sephardic surname). Yet it is not a "free lunch" to abandon it either.
Let N denote a latent index of personsutility from carrying a Sephardic surname. People
possess a Sephardic surname if and only if benetsexceed costs, which means:
Ni = 1 (N

i = 
Fi + V i  0) ; (2)
where F is a binary variable that equals one if person i0s father was born in Asia or Africa
and zero otherwise and V i = X
0
i
 + i . Hence N is exogenous neither to fathers origin
(F ) nor to individuals-specic market pays ("), suggesting that the wage gap between those
who choose to carry a Sephardic-sounding name and all others is subject to selection bias
(Fryer and Levitt, 2004b).
For simplicity of illustration, yet without losing generality, lets assume that the reduced
form relationship between possessing a Sephardic name (N) and fathers origin (F ) is:
Ni = Fi + Vi; (3)
where  is the di¤erence between the ratio of Sephardic sounding names among those whose




Hence, although intuitively appealing, consistent estimation of equation (1) calls for an
instrument. Since peoples surnames are not commonly available to the econometrician
we utilize fathers origin to estimate the parameter of interest in a reduced form setting.
Assuming that equation (3) approximates the reduced form linear relationship between a
persons name and his fathers origin then the reduced form equation of wages on fathers
ethnicity exhibits the following linear-in-the-parameters specication:
Yi = Fi + Ui; (4)
where Ui = X
0
i + i + "i, the structural interpretation of  is , and 0 <   1.
Following Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), AET henceforth, we utilize the bias on ob-
servables to assess bias on unobservables and obtain lower bound estimates for the impact of
discrimination on wages.11 The omitted variables formula implies that the OLS coe¢ cient






= 0. Note that in the particular case of a linear probability
model  = :
11Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) developed estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of
selection on the observed explanatory variables provides a guide to the amount of selection bias on the
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from a bivariate regression of wages on fathers origin (equation 4) is:
OLS =  + X + "; (5)






=var (F ) and " = cov ("; F ) =var (F ). Note that X is the bias
on the observables and " is the bias on the unobservables. Following AET, yet allowing the
selection on the unobservables (in wage units) to be  times the selection on the observables
in relative standardized wage units12, the OLS estimator, controlling for all observables,
equals to:






where R2X;F , the selection on the observable into F , equals to the proportion of variability
in F that is accounted explained by observables. Assuming, as in AET that the bias on
the unobservables (") is the same as selection on the index of observables (X), that is
 = "=X, then the OLS estimator provides a lower bound for the negative impact of




p lim OLS  : (7)
The minimum amount of selection on the unobservables relative to the selection on the










Our analysis focuses on children of interethnic unions. Using a wide range of observables, we
provide (i) a lower bound for the causal impact of discrimination on pay () assuming that
the bias on the unobservables is in the same direction as the bias on observables and (ii)
calculate the minimal amount of selection on the unobservables that is required to explain
fathers ethnicity e¤ect following the procedure o¤ered by AET (2005).
unobserved factors. They provide lower and upper bound estimates assuming that the ratio of selection on
unobservables is in the same direction as selection on the observables
12That is,  = k  ("=X) : The bias is identical to the analysis in AET (2005) for k = 1 that is,
 = ("=X).
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III.b Potential Threats to the Identication Strategy: Sorting into Interethnic
Unions and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital
The structural interpretation of the residual wage gap rests on the assumption that individu-
als born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers are similar to their Ashkenazi-Sephardic
counterparts in all respects that are relevant to labor market performance.
This is not a trivial assumption for two main reasons. First, people choose who they
marry. In a society in which being Sephardic is viewed as a negative cultural trait, one may
wonder which types of Ashkenazi women would bequeath a major handicap to their children
by equipping them with a Sephardic surname and whether such a choice reects child-raising
habits and parental treatment. Second, parents are not perfect substitutes. Fathers and
mothers have di¤erential inuences on the intergenerational transmission of human capital.
Under some conditions, therefore, AS may enjoy better home environments than those of the
SA even if pairing into mixed unions was random. We use the economics and sociology of
marriage and a rich set of measures of home environments and early achievements to address
conceptually and evaluate empirically these concerns.
The non-random matching of partners into interethnic couples is a cornerstone of our
identifying strategy because it helps address both of these concerns. Indeed, if interethnic
marriages were random, this would severely complicate our analyses. Since, on average,
the Ashkenazim have stronger socioeconomic characteristics than the Sephardim, random
marriage pairings would create asymmetric marriages: the average AS couple would consist
of a male with stronger socioeconomic traits than the female, while the average SA couple
would have a female with comparatively strong socioeconomic traits. Such asymmetric
pairings would dramatically complicate the interpretation of our ndings, especially given
the growing evidence on that mothers and fathers have di¤erent e¤ects on the formation of
the traits of their children, with correspondingly di¤erent e¤ects on labor market outcomes.13
Rather than marriage being random, a considerable body of work across economics,
sociology, and anthropology indicates that marriages exhibit strong sorting along many at-
tributes. An inuential line of research nds that people tend to marry others with very
similar socio-economic characteristics (Qian, 1997; Kalmijn, 1998; Browning, Chiappori, and
Weiss, 2008). These studies predict that interethnic unions - AS and SA marriages - will
be composed of partners with, on aggregate, homogenous traits. Research also considers in-
terethnic marriages, where a constellation of traits a¤ects matching. The leading theories in
economics (Becker, 1981) and sociology (Merton, 1941; Blau 1964) of intermarriage among
13Magruder (2010) nds that fathers serve as useful network connections to their sons but that mothers
do not seem to be useful network connections. Kimball, Sahm, Shapiro (2009) nd that mothers have larger
inuence on child risk tolerance than fathers; yet, the impact does not vary by o¤springs gender.
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ethnic and racial groups predict that Ashkenazim must be compensated for their higher
social status by intermarrying with Sephardim with other comparably valuable traits and
skills.14
Although this earlier literature does not provide predictions on whether the AS or the
SA pairings will have, on average, stronger socioeconomic traits, recent studies report that
women have a stronger preference for the income and ethnicity of their partner than vice
versa (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010). It is therefore plausible that, even if their earn-
ings, education and other traits were impressive, Sephardic men would nd it comparatively
di¢ cult to attract women from the very right tail of the Ashkenazi "talent" distribution.
The right tail of the Ashkenazi talentdistribution and the left tail of the Sephardic "tal-
ent" distribution will marry within groups. Yet for all others, highly educated economically
successful Sephardic men may be especially attractive to women with strong preferences for
human capital (and income), whereas less "talented" Ashkenazi men should have a compar-
ative advantage among women with strong tastes for perceived Ashkenazi ethnicity.
Thus, the economics and sociology of marriage suggest that both SA parents will be
similar to, if not better than, their AS peers in all respects relevant to their childrens labor
market performance. The di¤erential impacts of fathers and mothers will therefore have
minimal impact on the validity of our empirical setting.
Nevertheless, there are potential concerns. For example, the experience of growing up
in an SA family might be di¤erent from the experience of being raised in an AS family.
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews might not share similar child-raising habits, norms, tradi-
tions and beliefs that are essential for success in life. Sephardim might treat their children
di¤erently than Ashkenazim. For instance, if Sephardic fathers have a greater taste for quan-
tity (rather than quality) than their Ashkenazi peers, children of SA unions might earn less
than their counterparts for other reasons than perceived ethnicity.
However, the nature of the sorting into mixed unions and its implications on the inter-
generational transmission of preferences and human capital is, to some extent, testable.
Consequently, we now turn to the data.
IV Assessing the SA-AS Treatment and Comparison Groups
Setting: A Glance on the Observables
In this section, we present an array of empirical evidence that both supports the validity of
our identifying assumption and suggests that the data are biased toward nding that children
from SA parents will earn more than their AS counterparts. We compare measures of home
14See Fryer (2007) for further discussion on these models and evidence on recent trends.
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environments and family background, physical appearance, cognitive skills, cultural prefer-
ences, educational attainments, work habits and social networks by maternal and paternal
continent of origin.
Table 1 provides mean outcomes and inter-group comparisons. All measures indicate
that the contrast between those born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers (SA), the
"treatment group," and their "Ashkenazi-Sephardic" counterparts (AS), the "comparison
group," provide a conservative setting for estimating the causal e¤ect of perceived ethnic
a¢ liation, as signaled by family name, on wages.
IV.a Family and Home Environments
Employing our parents-o¤spring census le and the "synthetic" parentssample, we examine
family environment by parentsorigin. Results are found in Table 1 panel A. All measures
indicate that SA children were reared in advantageous family and home environments to
their AS peers. For example, consistent with the economics of marriage, we nd that fathers
of SA children have higher educational attainment and earned, on average, more than fathers
of AS children. This also holds for their spouses: European-American mothers in SA unions
have higher levels of education than Asian-African mothers in AS unions and earn more than
their counterparts.
The number of children in the family and the socioeconomic status of the communities
where they reside are also channels through which economic and cultural di¤erences among
ethnic groups may cause and reinforce disparities in cognitive abilities and non-cognitive
traits. For this reason, we examine these post-marriage outcomes. As a benchmark, note
that SS families have the highest number of children (4.4) whereas AA families have the
lowest number of children (2.1).15 As expected we nd much smaller di¤erences between
interethnic households. Ashkenazi mothers in SA unions report having, on average, slightly
fewer children (2.56) than their Sephardic counterparts in AS unions (2.86).
Finally, we use a composite index of socioeconomic status compiled by the Israel Central
Bureau of Statistics to examine the socioeconomic status of the communities where the
parents reside. Since these data are not available prior to 1983, we use the "synthetic"
parentssample. Consistent with parentseducational attainment and earnings, we nd that
AA and SA families resided in better socioeconomic communities than their AS peers, and
SS were concentrated in the least-developed communities.16
15Based either on the total number of children ever borne by respondents mother at the time of the 1972
Census (1983 Census for "synthetic parents" le) or the number of children in household at the time of the
interview.
16For further details see web appendix.
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IV.b Skin Tone
Sephardic Jews di¤er visually from their Ashkenazi brethren by virtue of their darker skin
tone. Despite sharing an origin point, Ashkenazi Jews often are lighter in skin, eye color
and hair than the Sephardim. The diversity of physical appearance, mainly through skin
and eye color, reects the degree of intermingling with the populations among which Jews
have lived.17 We use a global skin color distribution of native populations, based on the Von
Luschans chromatic scale, to assess the extent that sorting on skin tone into SA unions di¤ers
from matching into AS couples.18 Each parent was assigned a skin tone degree according to
her country of birth.19 Mean scores by fathersand mothersorigin are available in Table
1 panel (A). Higher scores indicate darker pigmentation. While partners in mixed unions
have slightly darker (lighter) skin tone than the typical Ashkenazi (Sephardic), we nd no
evidence for di¤erential sorting on skin tone between SA and AS.
IV.c Educational Attainment
Panel B displays measures of aggregate educational attainment and disaggregated measures,
breaking schooling into academic and vocational tracks.20 Separating schooling is relevant to
our context, since Shavit (1984) notes that low-achieving primary school students mainly
Sephardim were assigned to vocational tracks.21 The tracking policy was explicitly moti-
vated by the assumption that academic education is ill suited to their needs, inclinations,
and capabilities. It was also assumed that if placed in the academic tracks, most would drop
out prematurely (Shavit, 1984).
Three main facts emerge. First, there is no di¤erence between the aggregate years of
schooling completed by SA and AS. Second, SA complete more years of academic education,
17See Owens and King (1999).
18Von Luschans chromatic scale matches 36 di¤erent skin colors, from an unsaturated light color to a
saturated dark brown color. Subjects skin color is measured ideally in a place which would not be exposed
to the sun. In general, pinkish-white skin corresponds to 1-12 on the scale; white 12-14; white-light brown
15-17; light brown 18-23; brown 24-26; dark brown 27 or above.
19Measures by country are available at targetmap.com (http://www.targetmap.com/viewer.aspx?reportId=7301).
20The census documents the number of school years completed by individuals over the span of their
education. In addition it reports the number of years spent at primary or secondary schools, vocational
school, high-school, post-secondary school, university and "Yeshiva". The breakdown of total school years
into its components allows us to distinguish between years spent studying in academic tracks and those in the
vocational track as the former was a major part of the Israeli educational system. Academic tracks prepared
students for passing the exams needed to receive the matriculation diploma, which is also a pre-requisite for
higher education, while vocational tracks consisted of low-level academic studies and focused on vocational
training (Peleg and Adler (1977); Shavit (1984) and Shavit and Featherman (1988)).
21According to Shavit (1984) about 40 percent of Sephardim eighth graders scored in the bottom third of
the Seker score distribution and 2/3 scored in the bottom half. In comparison, among Ashkenazim, 75 and
60 percent scored in the top half and top third of the distribution respectively.
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while the AS complete more years of vocational education. For instance, SA men (aged
30 to 55 in 1995) completed about 0.35 more years of schooling in academic tracks than
their AS counterparts. Similarly, at the post-secondary level, we nd notable di¤erences in
sorting into academic and non-academic tracks. For example, the proportion of SA men
in post-secondary academic tracks is almost 10 percent higher than their AS peers. Third,
these SA-AS gaps are very similar for boys and girls. To the extent that schooling outcomes
reect parental treatments, we nd no evidence that SA children were under-treated by their
parents in comparison to their AS peers. We also nd no evidence for di¤erential treatment
of sons and daughters by fathersand mothersorigins in inter-ethnic families.
IV.d Cognitive Achievement Test Scores
Neal and Johnson (1996) nd that measures of cognitive achievement account for much of the
black-white wage gap in the US. While schooling and other forms of investment in human
capital, particularly in the early stages of childrens development, a¤ect performance on
cognitive tests (Shavit and Featherman 1988; Fryer and Levitt, 2004a; Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov, 2005), discrimination or social pressure ("acting white", Austen-Smith and
Fryer, 2005) are reasons why persons with similar family backgrounds, yet di¤erent ethnic
a¢ liation, might bring to the labor market di¤erent skill sets.22
We take advantage of the LHSIM data set to compare test scores on cognitive achieve-
ment tests by parentsorigin. Panel (B) reports standardized tests scores by parentsorigin
conditional on schooling. SA men do better on analytical test than men in all other groups
and as good as the AA men and better than all others on verbal tests. Most importantly,
we nd that the SA score about 0.45 and 0.25 standard deviations above their AS coun-
terparts on analytical and verbal tests respectively.23 These are at the order of magnitude
of the di¤erences between children of AA and SS families. It is worth noting that, while
AS achieve signicantly lower test scores than their SA counterparts, we nd the AS to
be statistically indistinguishable from their SS peers, scoring, in fact, only slightly better
(although statistically insignicant) than their SS peers on analytical test.
IV.e Cultural Capital: Evidence from Religious Practices
A focus on cognitive skill gaps, while grounded in the existing literature, might miss impor-
tant non-cognitive components of socioeconomic success. A growing literature documents
22Fryer and Levitt (2004a) eliminate the black-white test score gap in math and reading among incoming
kindergartners when they control for a small number of covariates, although not in subsequent years.
23We nd similar patterns using crude test scores.
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that non-cognitive traits human habits and social skills - are important for success in life.24
Israeli Jews of European or American origins are more likely to practice a secular western
lifestyle than Israeli Jews of Asian or African origin. If the more secular life style is associated
with greater economic success and if AS families are more secular than SA families, then
these noncognitive traits could account for the di¤erential wages of children from mixed
marriages and not ethnic discrimination.25
But we nd that SA families are slightly more secular than AS families. The LHSIM
data provides information on religiosity.26 Interviewees were asked retrospective questions
regarding past and present life domains, including whether their fathers used to observe
"kosher" food, wear a "kippah", whether their mothers cover their hair and use mikveon
a regular base and whether they practice that at present (binary indicators).27 Using these
indicators we sum the reports to generate religious practice indexes for fathers, mothers and
sons. Average values, range from 0, no practice at all, to 1 observing all items, are found in
Table 1, panel (C). Consistent with many observations, fathers in SS unions are much more
likely to keep traditional religious practices than their AA peers. To benchmark we begin
with the results for mothers and fathers in intra-ethnic unions (AA and SS). Both parents
in AA unions are less orthodox than mothers and fathers in SS families. While the vast
majority of fathers and mothers in SS families (0.79 and 0.71 respectively) follow the main
orthodox practices it is much less frequent among Ashkenazi men and women in AA unions
(0.43 and 0.41 respectively).
Consistent with the economics and sociology of marriage and with our identifying as-
sumption, we nd much smaller gaps between Ashkenazim and Sephardim in inter-ethnic
unions. Both parents in SA families are less orthodox than their AS peers (although dif-
24Bowles and Gintis (1976) were among the rst to argue that non-cognitive traits and behaviors are more
important than cognitive skills in determining schooling and employment outcomes. Jencks et al. (1979)
found that non-cognitive traits are at least as important overall as cognitive skills in explaining economic
success. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) show that while adults with GEDs perform better on cognitive
achievement tests than other high school dropouts and as well as ordinary high school graduates, they possess
lower levels of non-cognitive skills, which a¤ects their earnings. Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2002) provide
an insightful summary of theory and evidence.
25Cumulative disadvantage and advantage is a common pattern, and it is often attributed to family
di¤erential resources, child-raising behaviors and home environments (see Farkas, 2003; Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov, 2005).
26Of course, religious di¤erences are far from being the only potential source of inter-group variation in
non-cognitive traits. They are a particularly important one, however.
27The index for men is the sum of ve indicator variables receiving 1if the person reports he/his father
observed this religious practice. The ve practices are: wear Kippah; does not eat bread on Passover;
eats Kosher food, fasts on Yom Kippur and Lays Tllin. "Kippah" is a thin, slightly rounded skullcap
traditionally worn by observant Jewish men, also known as a "yarmulke." The index for mothersreligious
practice is the sum of four indicators, including female-specic practices including the use of mikve(a bath
use for purpose of ritual immersion) and hair covering.
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ferences are insignicant for fathers) and practically indistinguishable from their AA peers.
Ashkenazi mothers in SA families are less orthodox than Sephardic mothers in AS families
(0.43 and 0.56 respectively). This does not hold for men. Sephardic men in SA couples
practice to some extent less orthodox life style than their Ashkenazi peers in AS marriages
(0.52 and 0.58 respectively), despite Sephardic men on average being more observant than
Ashkenazi men.
Thus, it is not surprising to nd that sons of SA practice a less orthodox life style than
their AS peers. While the childrens generation is more secular than that of their parents,
children in SA families are signicantly less orthodox than their AS peers (0.35 and 0.49,
respectively). In fact children of the SA families are practically indistinguishable from their
AA peers (0.35 and 0.36 respectively).
Hence, while these crude measures hint toward cultural di¤erences between Ashkenazi
and Sepharadic Jews born to intra-ethnic unions, the data suggest that the children of the
SA are remarkably similar to their AA counterparts rather than to their SS peers. To the
extent that cultural aspects inuence the AA-SS residual wage gaps these ndings suggest
that children of the SA families should earn more than their AS peers.28
IV.f Networks: Sorting into High-Paid Occupations
Research in economics and sociology is replete with evidence pointing to the importance
of friends and relatives networks as sources of employment information (Montgomery,
1991, provides a summary).29 The community network not only nds jobs for its members,
but also channels them into higher-paying occupations. This might be very relevant for the
Israeli case.30
Although o¤spring of SA parents have better educational attainment, higher scores on
cognitive tests and higher levels of parental education and earnings than their AS peers,
they might lack labor market networks, if fathersorigin matters more than motherseth-
nicity.31 A possible concern is that fathers of SA children work in low prestige and under
28Last but not least, to the extent that heritage and cultural preferences are reected in own fertility
rates, the census data conrms that the SA, who have the lowest fertility rates, practice a western lifestyle.
Fernández and Fogli (2006) show that a womans heritage, proxied by her parents. country of origin, has a
non-negligible impact on fertility.
29For instance, Rees (1966) found that informal sources account for about half of those hired in white-collar
occupations and for most of all those hired in blue-collar occupations.
30Asian and African immigrants were directed by government agencies to peripheral locations and towns
located far from well-established urban centers (Semyonov and Tyree, 1981). Furthermore, they lacked
personal connections to those in power (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986), whereas European and Amer-
ican Jews held higher positions on all indicators of status and enjoyed more favorable opportunities for
achievement (Rosenstein, 1981).
31Güell, Mora and Telmer (2007) use the information contained in Spanish surnames to study the degree
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paid occupations. And that they are unable to provide useful labor market networks to their
o¤spring.
To address this concern, we document fathersand sonsoccupational choices. Results
are found in Table 1 panel (D). Occupations are sorted from the highest to the lowest pay
using the wage rates of AA workers (in 1995). We further use the wage rates of AA workers
in each occupation and apply those wage rates to all workers, to calculate the average wage
of each group (AA, AS, SA and SS) if they were paid the AA-wage rates.32 We repeat this
exercise twice, for fathers and for children. Figures are found at the top of each sub-panel.
Allocation to better paid occupations should be reected in higher projected wage rates.
We nd no evidence that the results are driven by network e¤ects. Fathers of SA
children worked in better-paid occupations than fathers of AS children. They sorted into
higher prestige occupations such as managers and academic professionals to a greater degree
than fathersof AS children (15% more). In contrast, fathers of AS children are much more
likely to work in manufacturing, transportation, and construction (14% more). These gaps
are well reected in projected earnings (10% more). To the extent that fathersoccupational
choices provide a foundation for their o¤springs careers, children of SA families should work
in better paid occupations than their AS peers. Yet, childrens of SA do not replicate their
fatherssuccess in the labor market. We nd that SA individuals work in slightly better-paid
occupations than their AS counterparts and would have earned a trivial amount more than
AS children if both AS and SA were paid the AA-wage rates.
IV.g Labor Market Attachment
Do SA have di¤erent preferences toward work than their AS peers? Are SA more likely
to sort into low e¤ort jobs relative to their AS counterparts? The last panel of Table 1
(Panel D) takes a brief glance at these issues. We nd no evidence for that. Employment
rates and the proportion of self-employed of the SA are slightly higher, although statistically
insignicant, than those of their AS peers and they have equal chances to be working at the
government sector. Yet, conditional on working we nd that SA work more hours than their
AS peers, in a similar order of magnitude to the AA-SS gaps.
IV.h In summary
All available measures of premarket factors, including family background, human capital,
cultural traditions and social networks indicate that it will be safe to conclude that the
of intergenerational mobility of an economy.
32For each occupation we calculated the average hourly wage of an AA worker. Hourly wages in Table 1
are presented in US Dollars ($) using the 1995 exchange rate.
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wage gap between SA and AS men provides a conservative estimate for the impact of ethnic
discrimination on earnings.
V The Impact of Sephardic Surname on Market Pay
We estimate the mean wages of Israeli-born male Jews, FTFY, aged 30-55, whose parents
were born outside Israel by the origin of the father and mother. The results are found in
Table 2.
The benchmark group consists of Israeli-born Jews whose fathers were born in Europe
or America and whose mothers were born in Asia or Africa (AS). The rst column reports
the crude gap. The rst entry in the panel (-0.07) is the average crude wage gap in log
hourly wages between SA workers and their AS counterparts. In the next two columns
we sequentially introduce xed e¤ects for education and potential experience, residential
location, occupations and industries.
Two main ndings emerge. First, as one would have expected, crude wages of o¤spring
to interethnic unions fall in between AA and SS workers. Israeli Jews whose parents were
both born in Asia or in Africa (SS, the lowest-paid group), earn about one half of their AA
counterparts, the highest-paid group.
Second, in contrast with a host of background and achievement characteristics, we nd
that Israeli Jews born to fathers from Asian-African origin and mothers from European-
American origin (SA) earn between 7 to 11 percent less than their AS counterparts.
This gap in pay, which is similar to the residual wage gap between SS and AA workers (8
to 13 percent), cannot be attributed either to educational attainment, location of residence,
or sorting into better paid occupations and industries; in fact, our estimates indicate that SA
workers hold better-paid occupations than AS workers. For instance, SA workers ages 30 to
55 earn 7 percentage points less than their AS peers (column i). Introducing the rst and the
second sets of controls, the estimated mean gaps in residual wages are about 8 percentage
points, accounting for education and potential experience, and 11 points once occupation,
industry and location of residence xed e¤ects are included, which is suggestive that selection
on observables (columns (ii) and (iii) respectively) cannot explain the raw di¤erence in wage
rates (column i). These patterns also hold for ages 22 to 65 as well and are robust to part
time work suggesting that ndings do not reect a selection bias to the sample.33
Although AA workers earn more than their AS counterparts and SS workers earn less
than their SA peers when no controls are included, we nd almost no di¤erences between
33The corresponding point estimates and standard errors for 22 to 65 years of age are 9.7 (3.1), 5.9 (2.7)
and 6.9(2.6). See web appendix. Furthermore, we nd no evidence for di¤erential selection into the salaried
FTFY sample. See appendix Table A1.
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AA and AS workers or between SS and SA workers once we control for education, potential
experience, location of residence and occupation.
V.a Di¤erentiating by Skin Color
Intuitively, a persons surname shapes markets perception of ethnicity more when labor
market cannot discern his ethnicity through other observed means, such as skin tones. For
this reason our benchmark setting focuses on children of interethnic unions. On average, AS
and SA children have similar, mild skin tones. The average skin tone of AS and SA children
- approximated by Von Luschans chromatic scale and parentscountry of origin - is 6.73
and 6.80 in comparison to 5.49 and 7.96 for children of AA and SS families, respectively.
Yet, not all are the same. This holds also for children of mixed unions too. If indeed
our ndings reect the impact of perceived ethnicity on earnings, the impact should be
attenuated when skin tones are very light or dark and the impact of ethnic sounding names
should be larger when skin tones are close to the mean and hence provide less of a signal. To
further distinguish among people where surname is a better - or worse - signal of ethnicity,
we use the Von Luschans chromatic scale and parentscountry of origin to estimate residual
SA-AS wage gaps for di¤erent bands around the population mean.
The results in Table 2 support our interpretation that labor markets discriminate based on
perceived ethnicity. Columns (iv) to (vii) report point estimates for four sub-samples: people
whose parents average Von Luschan chromatic scale is withinand beyondone standard
deviation (-1/+1) of the sample mean skin tone and people whose parents skin tone is
within and beyond one-half of one standard deviation (-0.5/+0.5) of the mean Von Luschan
skin tone value. Two main facts emerge. First, the earnings di¤erence between SA and AS
children is larger when skin tone provides little information on ethnic heritage. It grows
from 11%, to 12%, and 14%. Second, the earnings di¤erence between SA and AS children is
smaller when skin tone is either darker or lighter. The residual wage gaps drops from 11%
to 10% (outside the (-0.5/+0.5) band and 7.7% outside the (-0.5/+0.5 and -1/+1 bands
respectively).
V.b Bias on the Unobservables
Although the evidence suggests that selection on observables works against our nding that
SA earn less than AS, it is possible that some amount of selection on unobservables could
explain the SA-AS wage gap. To explore, and quantify, this possibility, we measure the
amount of selection on the index of observables and then calculate a ratio of how large
selection on unobservables would need to be in order to attribute the entire e¤ect to selection
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bias. We report our ndings in the bottom row of Table 2.
The results indicate that selection on unobservables is probably not driving the results.
In particular, the rst entry (-3.028, column ii) reports the relative amount of selection on
unobservables required to explain the SA-AS wage gap. It means that the normalized shift
in the distribution of the unobservables would have to be in an opposite direction to the
selection on observables and 3.03 times as large as the shift in the observables (in absolute
terms) to explain away the entire SA-AS residual wage gap. This seems highly unlikely.
The next entry reports the amount of selection required to explain the SA-AS gap when
the set of observables includes location of residence, occupation and industry xed e¤ects.
The amount of selection bias on unobservables in this case would have to be negative and
1.6 times larger than selection on observables to explain the entire SA-AS gap in residual
wages and about 2 times larger when we restrict the sample to observation that their Von
Luschans chromatic scale is within a one standard deviation (-1/+1). AET (2005) consider
such a large reversal of the selection on observables as highly unlikely.
V.c Interpretation
In contrast to the SS-AA context in which pay di¤erences are closely linked to observed
di¤erences in home environment and scholastic achievements, all available measures indicate
that Israeli-born Jews whose fathers were born in Asia or Africa and whose mothers were born
in Europe or America (SA) are better in all respects that might be relevant to performance
in the labor markets than their AS counterparts. Thus while one might expect SA men
to be paid more than their AS peers, SA workers earn signicantly less than their AS
counterparts despite having higher scores on cognitive tests, and higher levels of parental
education and earnings. This contrast, summarized in Figure 2 suggests that selection on
the unobservables is highly unlikely to explain away the SA-AS residual wage gap. Selection
bias on unobservables, such as non-cognitive traits, preferences and networks, would have
to be large and in the opposite direction to the selection on observables to account for the
SA-AS gap in residual wages.
V.d Caveats
Conceptually we attempt to identify the ceteris paribus e¤ect of ethnic discrimination on pays
using the SA-AS treatment-comparison format. Yet, the gap in pays might reect systematic
di¤erences between AS and SA that are not captured by our measures of culture and human
capital. While intuitively appealing, the assumption that we can infer and correct for the
bias on the unobservables using the bias on the observables might not hold for o¤spring of
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interethnic unions. In the next section we utilize the common practice of married women to
adopt their spousessurname to examine the robustness of the structural interpretation to
latent SA and AS specic impacts on o¤spring labor market outcomes.
VI ParentsEthnicity and Womens Pay
In Israel, there has long been a patriarchal tradition for a woman to change her surname
upon marriage from her birth name to her husbands last name.34 Hence, while Sephardic
and Ashkenazi Jews have distinct surnames passed from father to o¤spring, e¤ectively the
genealogy of family names holds after marriage only for men.
The gender-specic linkage between father and father-in-laws ethnicity and own surname
o¤ers two testable implications. First, if labor markets discriminate on the basis of perceived
ethnic a¢ liation, womens wages should be less associated with their fathersorigin than
mens wages. Second, the wages of married women should be more powerfully shaped by
the ethnicity of their father-in-law than by the ethnicity of their own father. We further
elaborate these venues in the coming sections.
VI.a The SA-AS Wage Gap among Women
To assess whether the earlier results for men reect latent SA-AS factors rather than labor
market discrimination, we repeat our experiment for women. While the vast majority of
women aged 30 to 55 born to intra-ethnic unions marry within their ethnic group (about
80%), females born to mixed couples tend to marry almost equally inside and outside of
their fathersethnic groups. About one half of AS women (47%) and slightly less among
SA women (44%) marry outside of their fathersethnic groups, indicating that for women,
unlike for men, the shares of AS and SA who actually carry a Sephardic surname are roughly
equal. Thus, markets should be unable to distinguish between AS and SA married women
based on their surnames, but markets should be able to distinguish between AS and SA
women who did not married, as they do among men.
34Jewish marriage (and divorce) in Israel is under the jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. The
rabbi performing the wedding is considered, according to the law, the o¢ cial marriage registrar. A notice
of the marriage is transmitted directly from the regional rabbinate to the Interior Ministry. According
to the Israeli law on names (1956), "upon marriage a woman receives her husbands surname, yet, she
has the right, in any time, to add her maiden surname or to keep it". In practice, however, the Israeli
Interior Ministry made it di¢ cult for women to keep their maiden names. Therefore in 1996, the Israeli
parliament revised the original law on names (revision 3) in a way that does not present any particular




Using the statistical specications employed for working men, we estimate mean wages by
fathersand mothersorigin for FTFY, rst for all working women (rst panel) and then by
marital status (second panel). The results are found in Table 3.
The rst column reports the crude gaps. The second column provides the residual wage
gaps accounting for education and potential experience. The third column reports the resid-
ual wage gaps controlling also for place of residence, occupational and industry xed e¤ects.
Three main facts emerge. First we nd almost no di¤erence between the mean wages of
AS and SA FTFY working women (rst panel). SA women earn, on average, the same as
their AS counterparts (column (i)).35 This holds when we control for educational attainment
and potential experience (column (ii)), and accounting for place of residence occupational
and industry xed e¤ects (column (iii)). Second, we nd no di¤erence between the mean
wages of AS and SA ever married women (second panel). In fact, the point estimates are
virtually zero (between -0.004 and 0.016 for crude and residual earnings respectively). Third,
in contrast to our ndings for married women, yet in accordance with our results for men,
we nd notable wage gaps between SA and AS single (never married) women. The small
sample size (of SA and AS in this category) suggests that ndings should be taken with a
grain of salt. Yet, the crude wage gaps between SA and AS women who carry their fathers
surnames are similar in magnitude to what we found for men (-6.7%), although statistically
insignicant, whereas the residual wage gap are even larger than those found for men.
VI.c Structural Interpretation
Our ndings are consistent with the interpretation that the measured gap in mens wages
between SA and AS workers reects discrimination based on ethnic a¢ liation signaled by a
personsfamily name. Using SA-AS wage gaps among women to draw inferences about a bias
on the unobservables among men relies on the assumption that SA parents treat their sons
and daughters the same as (or better than) their AS peers. We nd no evidence to refute
this assumption. Both sons and daughters of SA parents complete more years in academic
tracks, are more likely to achieve an academic degree and spend more years at university
level studies at a very similar order of magnitude (see Table 1, Panel B). The di¤erence in
the SA-AS wage gap by marital status should remove any further concerns.
35It is worth noticing that women born to inter-ethnic unions are slightly more likely to marry within their
fathers ethnic group (see web appendix), which means that SA women should earn slightly less than their
AS peers.
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VII The Impact of Fathersand Fathers-in-Law Ethnicity on
Womens Pay
While parentsorigin determines a womans ethnicity, it is her father-in-laws surname that
is observed by labor markets. If the perceived ethnic a¢ liation is what matters, married
womens wages should reect their father-in-laws origin rather than their own ethnicity.
To take advantage of the di¤erences between womens actual and perceived ethnicity, due
to marriage, we classify the population of married women into four groups by the origin of
both their fathers and their fathers-in-law: (i) HWAA, women whose fathers and fathers-in-
law were born in Europe or America; (ii) HWSS, women whose fathers and fathers-in-law
were born in Asia or in Africa; (iii) HWSA, women whose fathers were born in Europe
or America but whose fathers-in-law were born in Asia or Africa, and (iv) HWAS, women
whose fathers were born in Asia or Africa but whose fathers-in-law were born in Europe or
America.
Since Ashkenazi and Sephardic look quite di¤erent, the appropriate setting should focus
on observably similar women with di¤erent ethnic last names. Since we expect name labels
to be especially e¤ective in manipulating the perceived ethnicity of people with mild skin
color the e¤ect of father-in-laws ethnicity on all others can be served as a falsication test.
We make two e¤orts in this front. First, we take advantage of the global skin color
distribution of native populations, based on the Von Luschans chromatic scale, to proxy
personsskin tone degree by their parentsorigin. Employed with these proxies we separate
the population of married women to those within a one standard deviation (-1/+1) around
the population sample mean, for whom name labels sound credible, and all others. Second,
we restrict our analysis to daughters of SA or AS families who are married to men with
Sephardic or Ashkenazi last names.36 We estimate the impact of father-in-laws separately
for each group.
VII.a Findings
We next turn to the wage outcomes. Results are found in Table 4. The table contains
two panels reporting Sephardic-Ashkenazi crude and residual wage gaps. In the top panel,
the Sephardic-Ashkenazi wage gap is measured among Israeli married women classied into
four groups by fathers and their father-in-laws origin. The rst entry in each panel re-
ports the residual wage gaps conditional on education and potential experience. The second
entry provides the residual gaps controlling for education and potential experience and ac-
counting for location of residence occupational and industry xed e¤ects respectively. In
36We thank an anonymous referee for this idea.
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the next columns, we report results for sub-samples of married women either with mild or
with extreme skin tones. The second panel repeats these experiments for the sub-sample of
daughters of SA or AS families.
Three main ndings emerge. First, Ashkenazi women married to Sephardic men (HWSA)
earn substantially less than their mixed-union counterparts (HWAS) who reside in neighbor-
hoods with comparable socioeconomic proles, possess similar educational credentials and
occupations and work in the same industries. For instance, HWSA women earn between 5
to 6 percentage points less than their HWAS peers (columns (i) and (ii)).
Second, the fathers-in-law impact holds only for women with neither too light nor too
dark skin tone. Specically, HWSA married women whose parentstone color ranges within
1 standard deviation around the population sample mean earn 6 percentage points below
their HWAS peers (column iii). In contrast we nd no HWSA e¤ect women whose tone skin
is either too dark or too light. The point estimate is virtually zero (column iv).
Third, the impact of fathers-in-law ethnicity is especially pronounced among daughters
of inter-ethnic families. Daughters of AS families married to a Sephardic men earn between
8 to 11 percentage points less than their AS peers married to an Ashkenazi men (panel B
columns i and ii) in comparison to 5 percentage points among all married women. It is worth
noticing that skin tone matters - even among daughters of inter-ethnic couples. Controlling
for education and experience, we nd that these results hold only for women whose parents
skin color is within a 1 standard deviation around the population sample mean (columns iii
and iv).37
VII.b Structural Interpretation
We nd that the e¤ect of perceived ethnicity among women to be of the same order of
magnitude found among men. The fact that father-in-laws ethnicity matters is consistent
with our interpretation of the SA-AS comparisons that labor markets discriminate based
on perceived ethnicity. The fact that father-in-laws ethnicity matters only for a sub-set of
the population with mild tone color for whom ethnic-name labels sound credible helps
separate between alternative structural interpretations.
Sorting into inter-ethnic marriage is not exogenous to human capital and earnings. While
intermarriage is much more likely to take place among the highly educated, pairings might
exhibit asymmetric patterns.38 For example, Lam and Schoeni (1994) nd that in Brazil,
37Due to sample size limitations we do not control for location of residence, occupations and industries
xed e¤ects. Our previous analysis, for men and women (Table 2 and Table 3), indicate that estimates are
robust to the exclusion of these indicators.
38Recently, Qian and Lichter (2011) found that while interracial marriages are becoming more common,
skin color still a¤ects spouse choice in America. Most black-white couples have similar educations whereas
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father-in-law matters more than father, and they attribute this trend to unobservables.
Furthermore, selection into the workforce might generate a non-trivial bias if it varies sys-
temically by husbandsorigin. Although we nd almost no di¤erences between the share of
workers (or FTFY) among married women in interethnic unions (summary statistics, Table
A2), sorting into the workforce might matter if, for instance, HWAS women are positively
selected and Ashkenazi women married to Sephardic men are negatively selected. Following
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), we consider the potential magnitude of latent factors and
the role of di¤erential selection into the workforce on our ndings by utilizing husbands
wages to impute wivespotential wages (for those who do not work). Clearly, if the hus-
bands wage were a fair proxy for the wifes potential wage, then it would be fair to conclude
that HWSA women are paid signicantly less than their HWAS counterparts (see Figure
3).39 Point estimates range between -0.053, for all working women, to -0.062 when we use
husbandsresidual wages to impute missing wages.40
Marriage itself may have di¤erential detrimental e¤ects on womens careers and wages
via within-household specialization (Becker 1981).41 A married womans wage prole is
therefore complicated not only by her childbearing decisions, but also by the amount of time
she spends away from the labor market because of childrearing. Based on fertility rates and
labor supply gures, there is no evidence that Ashkenazi women in SA couples (HWSA) are
more likely to specialize in home production than Sephardic women in AS unions (HWAS).
VII.c Accounting for Pre-Marriage Wage Gaps
To account for pre-existing wage gaps, we exploit the linked 1983-1995 census sample. Using
a subsample of women who married between 1983 and 1995, we regress the change in log
hourly wages on the change in perceived ethnicity. The independent variable of interest is the
change in perceived Sephardic ethnicity. We use two specications. First, we follow the wage
level specication and set the change in ethnicity variable to 1 for Ashkenazi women who
married Sephardic men, to 0 for all women who married within their fathersorigin and to -1
highly educated blacks and whites are more likely to intermarry, which means that white wives get more
than their shareof well-educated black husbands.
39Figure 3 depicts wives wage residuals (imputed from the specication in Table 4) together with their
husbandseducational attainment and wage residuals.
40Observed wages might be particularly misleading (see Neal, 2004; and Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008).
Indeed patterns vary by type of union. While married women in intra-ethnic unions are more likely to sort
into the workforce, the better educated is their spouse, and less likely to work the better paid he is, we nd
womens labor supply in mixed unions to be uncorrelated with their spouse characteristics. Correction for
selection and robustness to part-time jobs and age restrictions are available on the web appendix.
41Daily home production activities that have been traditionally a wifes responsibility are the kinds of
chores that are most negatively associated with womens wages (Hersch and Leslie, 2002), although this
trend might reect selection rather than the causal impact of specialization.
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for Sephardic women who marry Ashkenazi men. Second, we estimate a exible specication
in which we allow for asymmetric impacts. Since wage proles might systematically di¤er
by a persons ethnicity, we allow the change in wages over the life cycle to vary by fathers
ethnicity. We estimate the coe¢ cients of interest for all working women.42 Results are found
in Table 5, though we do caution against drawing very strong inferences because of the small
sample size.
Two main ndings emerge. First, we nd that the change in log hourly wages is positively
correlated with a switch to perceived Ashkenazi ethnicity. For instance, in the restricted
specication we nd that switching into an Ashkenazi (Sephardic) surname by marriage is
associated with an increase (drop) of a 16 percentage points in hourly wages (column (i)).
Second, the increase in Sephardic womens wages after marrying Ashkenazi men is slightly
larger than the drop in hourly wages for Ashkenazi women who married a Sephardic men,
0.19 and -0.09 log points respectively (column (ii)), consistent with sorting on wages into
inter-ethnic unions.
Yet, sorting into interethnic unions is exogenous neither to pre-marriage factors nor to
economic benets from marriage. The social-exchange literature (Merton, 1941; Blau 1964)
predicts that Ashkenazi men must be compensated for their higher social status when inter-
marrying with Sephardic women with other valuable qualities. While the change in earnings
accounts for sorting on time invariant unobserved factors, the before-after comparison might
still exaggerate the impact of perceived ethnicity on pays, if marriage outside ethnic group
reforms social networks,43, or if pre-marriage abilities are reected in earnings over time.
Yet, it is worth noticing that these results are consistent with the interpretation that much
of the wage gap among o¤spring born to mixed couples or between women married outside
of their ethnic groups reect their perceived ethnicity signaled by family name, rather than
their actual ethnicity.
VIII Conclusions
In this paper we o¤er a novel approach to identify the causal impact of perceived ethnicity on
wages in observational data. We take advantage of the ethnic-related genealogy of persons
42Due to sample size limitation we do not restrict the sample to FTFY. We control for labor supply e¤ect
on earnings using FTFY indicators for 1983 and 1994.
43Arai and Thoursie (2009) have found, using a sample of immigrants to Sweden who registered a name-
change with the Swedish government between 1991 and 2000 that African, Asian and Slavic immigrants
earned on average 141% more after they abandoned their foreign-sounding names. Earnings increased mostly
at the extensivemargin that is for those reported little or no earnings before; much more for women who
tripled their labor market income, reecting, according to the authors, indirect network e¤ects.
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family names, the non-random paring into interethnic unions, and ethnic diversity in skin
tones to identify labor market discrimination in pays.
In our benchmark research design, we focus on individuals born to interethnic unions
to compare the wages of individuals who are similar in all respects that are relevant to
performance and are di¤erent only in their perceived ethnicity as signaled by their inherited
ethnic-sounding family names.
We nd that Israeli male workers born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers (SA)
earn between 7 to 11 percent less than their Ashkenazi counterparts (AS), which is of the
order of magnitude of the residual wage gap between SS and AA workers. In contrast to
other contexts, in which ethnic pay di¤erences are closely linked to observed di¤erences in
human capital, all available measures indicate that Israeli-born Jews born to SA parents
have similar, if not superior, characteristic that shape labor market outcomes as their AS
counterparts. Thus, while one might expect SA men to earn more than their AS peers,
they are paid much less. This contrast, summarized in Figure 2, suggests that the bias on
unobservables, such as non-cognitive traits, preferences and networks, would have to be in
an opposite direction to the selection on observables and of a much larger in scale to account
for the SA-AS gap in residual wages.
We further exploit a common tradition in many cultures, the custom of brides adopting
the last names of grooms, to disentangle the impact of how the market perceives the ethnicity
of woman from the womans actual ethnicity. If labor markets discriminate against women
on the basis of perceived ethnicity, we should nd that it is the father-in-laws ethnicity, not
the ethnicity of the womans actual father that matters. Consistent with the view that labor
markets discriminate based on perceived ethnic a¢ liation, we nd the following. We nd no
di¤erences between the hourly wages of AS and SA women, who are equally likely to carry
a Sephardic surname, as both groups marry Sephardic and Ashkenazi men roughly in equal
proportions. Yet, we nd large disparities between of AS and SA single women, who still
carry their fatherssurname. We also nd that Ashkenazi women married to Sephardic men
earn less than their Sephardic counterparts despite having better educational attainment
and being married to higher paid and better educated spouses. These ndings are consistent
with the interpretation that the measured gap in mens wages between SA and AS workers
reects discrimination based on ethnic a¢ liation, not di¤erences in non-cognitive traits that
are the result of di¤erences in upbringing between AS and SA households.
We go further by distinguishing among people where surname is a better - or worse - signal
of ethnicity. We build on the insight that a persons surname shapes markets perception of
ethnicity more when labor market cannot discern a persons ethnicity through other observed
means, such as skin tones. Ashkenazi Jews often are lighter in skin, eye color and hair than
30
the Sephardim. This diversity reects intermingling with the populations among which Jews
have lived. We use Von Luschans chromatic scale and parentscountry of origin to assign a
skin tone to each person.
When we apply that to the analysis among men and women we nd that the impact of
fathers (for men) and fathers-in-law ethnicity (for married women) is larger. It is especially
pronounced among married women with neither too dark nor too light skin tone. In contrast
we nd no e¤ect for all others.
Name labels manipulate perception when ethnic names sound credible. To the best of
our knowledge this is the rst paper to incorporate this insight into the empirical design in
order to identify the causal impact of perceived ethnicity in observational data.
Ethnic discrimination might reect both the outcome of a "taste for discrimination" or
the result of ethnic stereotypes. Statistical discrimination is di¢ cult to identify, since wages
vary over the life cycle due to reasons other than market learning. In the absence dataset that
contains o¤spring of interethnic couples and data on training and other forms of investment
in human capital, a more rigorous examination of the underlying mechanism is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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A Data Appendix
I.a The Israeli Census
Our main sample includes Israeli-born Jews whose parents were born outside of Israel. These
are classied into four subgroups (AA, SS, AS, and SA), where o¤spring of mixed couples
(AS and SA) are about 4 percent of the main sample (Figure 1). The Census provides 2202
and 2049 observations in the male and female prime age AS and SA subsamples respectively.
The appendix provides detailed information on the sample and summary statistics.
Since a three years army service at age 18 is mandatory in Israel, our sample includes
individuals who are 22 to 65 year old, and our prime age sample includes individuals who
are 30 to 55 year old. We exclude observations with missing data on age, gender, country of
birth and parentscountry of birth (for Israeli-born), educational attainment, and place of
residence.44 We classify the population into eight educational categories and nine localities of
residence. Our wage sample excludes self-employed individuals or observations with imputed
wages. We focus on full-time (at least 35 work hours per week), full-year (12 month) workers
(hereafter FTFY) who worked the entire month for which salary is reported. We trim wage
outliers when calculating mean wages by excluding the bottom and top one percentile of the
salaried Jewish male FTFY workers in the wage distribution.
The census data does not provide information on family background other than parents
country of origin. Therefore, we utilize the 1972 census sample, the earliest to contain
information on educational attainment and earnings, and the 1983 sample, the rst to include
community-level socioeconomic status measures to construct (i) a parents-o¤spring le that
links children to their parents using the 1972 census le and (ii) a "synthetic" parents le
with data taken from the 1983 census sample. The parents-o¤spring le covers the family
background of children born between 1954 and 1972 that is individuals aged 23 to 41 in
1995.45
The "synthetic" parents le provides the characteristics of mothers and fathers in unions
that the mother is at the age group that allows her to have children aged 30 to 55 in 1995.
We further use the 1972 and 1983 census les to depict gaps in educational attainment and
44There are 1,113,420 observations in the census. Our process of sample selection leaves us with 163,173
males ages 22-65 and 106,459 males ages 30-55. After excluding individuals who were not born in Israel or
whose parents were born in Israel we are left with 71,634 males ages 22-65 and 49346 males ages 30-55. See
Appendix A1 for males and A2 for females.
45To provide a representative sample of the childrens population we exclude children older than 18 years
of age.
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earnings between Sephardic (Asian-African) and Ashkenazi (European-American) Jews and
provide an overview of inter- and intra-ethnic marriages over generations and time.
The 1983-1995 joint individual record matches observations from the 20 percent public-
use micro samples taken from the 1983 and the 1995 Israeli censuses. As such, it covers
approximately 4 percent of the Israeli population. Using a subsample of women who married
between 1983 and 1995 we examine the impact of a womans perceived ethnicity as signaled
by her own origin before marriage and by her father-in-laws origin once married, on wages.
Data processing for the 1972, 1983 and the linked 1983-1995 samples follows the same basic
processing employed for the 1995 main sample, when applicable (summary statistics Table
A3).
I.b Life History Study of Israeli Men
The Life History Study of Israeli Men (LHSIM) is a systematic stratied national probability
sample of Jewish Israeli men born in 1954 who were randomly selected from the draft list
of the army and lived in Israel in 1970 who were interviewed when they were approximately
twenty-seven years old (Matras, Gila, and Bar Haim, 1984). In addition to standard socioe-
conomic and demographic indicators, the data set contains military test scores retrieved from
the military les (Shavit, 1984; Shavit and Featherman, 1988). We use the version revised
by Shavit in 1994. This version of the LHSIM includes scores of tests taken by the respon-
dents before joining the IDF. These include verbal and analytic test scores. The interview
consisted of retrospective questions about areas of life such as religious practice, which we
utilize as well. Our main sample contains complete information on 1128 observations after
excluding those who are foreign-born or have missing demographics.
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Father's and Mother's Origin
SS-AA SA-AS
AA AS SA SS Gap (S.E) Gap (S.E)
Variables and Data Source (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Panel A: Family Background
Source: Offspring-Parents file based on 1972 census (N = 187,240)
and "Synthetic" Parents^ file based on 1983 census (N = 83,818)
Father's education
  -Years of schooling completed 10.54 9.15 10.19 6.04 -4.50 (0.03) 1.04 (0.11)
  -Matriculation 0.33 0.18 0.31 0.07 -0.26 (0.00) 0.13 (0.01)
  -Academic degree 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.11 (0.00) 0.04 (0.01)
Mother's education
  -Years of schooling completed 10.08 8.31 9.81 4.63 -5.45 (0.03) 1.50 (0.11)
  -Matriculation 0.31 0.15 0.27 0.04 -0.27 (0.00) 0.12 (0.01)
  -Academic degree 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.05 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01)
Father's log hourly wages 1.64 1.46 1.52 1.24 -0.40 (0.00) 0.06 (0.02)
Mother's log hourly wages 1.36 1.16 1.29 0.86 -0.50 (0.01) 0.13 (0.05)
Number of siblings 2.10 2.86 2.56 4.40 2.30 (0.01) -0.30 (0.04)
Community socioeconomics^^
  - CBS socioeconomic index 0.60 0.55 0.64 0.20 -0.41 (0.01) 0.09 (0.02)
   -Log of monthly income per capita 5.02 4.99 5.01 4.87 -0.15 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01)
Appearance (Skin Tone: Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale)^^^
Father's  skin tone (mean of scale) 5.48 5.64 7.85 7.95 2.47 (0.00) 2.21 (0.02)
Mother's  skin tone (mean of scale) 5.50 7.82 5.74 7.98 2.48 (0.00) -2.08 (0.02)
Parents'  skin tone (mean of scale) 5.49 6.73 6.80 7.96 -2.47 (0.00) 0.07 (0.01)
Panel B: Educational Attainment  and Achievement on Cognitive Tests
Source: 1995 census (men: N = 43,619 ; women: N = 45,351)
All Men
   -Total school years reported 14.20 12.99 12.97 11.57 -2.63 (0.03) -0.02 (0.14)
Years in academic/vocational track after completing primary school
     -Academic 3.88 2.38 2.74 1.18 -2.70 (0.04) 0.36 (0.17)
     -Vocational 2.31 2.57 2.24 2.41 0.10 (0.02) -0.33 (0.11)
Mens' Education
 Source: 1983 census - Socioeconomic 
Classification of Statistical Areas
Table 1
Home Environments, Scholastic Achievements and Occupational Choices
Israeli-Born Jews, by Father’s and Mother’s Origin
Differences
SS-AA SA-AS
AA AS SA SS Gap (S.E) Gap (S.E)
Variables and Data Source (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Panel B Cont.
Men completing 12 years of schooling
Fraction completing 12 years of schooling 0.25 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.10 (0.00) -0.01 (0.02)
Years spent in academic/vocational track
     -Academic 1.30 1.04 1.32 0.89 -0.42 (0.04) 0.28 (0.15)
     -Vocational 2.62 2.89 2.61 3.08 0.45 (0.04) -0.27 (0.15)
Men completing at least 13 years of schooling
Fraction completing at least 13  years of schooling 0.60 0.42 0.39 0.21 -0.39 (0.00) -0.02 (0.02)
    -Total years 16.16 15.58 16.02 15.09 -1.08 (0.03) 0.44 (0.15)
    -Fraction with academic degree 0.62 0.48 0.57 0.35 -0.27 (0.01) 0.09 (0.04)
    -Years in university 3.42 2.66 3.20 1.92 -1.50 (0.04) 0.53 (0.20)
    -Years in post-secondary 0.75 0.92 0.77 1.17 0.41 (0.02) -0.15 (0.09)
Mens' matriculation rates 0.62 0.46 0.53 0.34 -0.28 (0.03) 0.07 (0.16)
 (source: Life History Survey of Israeli Men (N=1,128) available for men only)
-Standardized score of analytical test (source: Life History Survey of Israeli Men (N=1,128))
    Conditional on school years completed 0.56 0.33 0.78 0.28 -0.28 (0.06) 0.45 (0.21)
-Standardized score of  verbal test 
    Conditional on school years completed 0.71 0.43 0.68 0.32 -0.39 (0.05) 0.25 (0.21)
All Women
   -Total school years reported 14.21 13.08 13.27 11.85 -2.35 (0.03) 0.20 (0.14)
Years in academic/vocational track after completing primary school
     -Academic 4.47 3.11 3.50 1.74 -2.73 (0.03) 0.38 (0.16)
     -Vocational 1.71 1.90 1.76 2.11 0.40 (0.02) -0.14 (0.10)
Women completing 12 years of schooling
Fraction completing 12 years of schooling 0.27 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.12 (0.00) -0.02 (0.02)
Years spent in academic/vocational track
     -Academic 2.27 1.93 2.03 1.45 -0.82 (0.04) 0.10 (0.16)
     -Vocational 1.65 1.95 1.96 2.52 0.87 (0.04) 0.00 (0.16)
Women completing at least 13 years of schooling
Fraction completing at least 13  years of schooling 0.62 0.42 0.44 0.24 -0.38 (0.00) 0.02 (0.02)
    -Total years 15.95 15.63 15.91 15.13 -0.82 (0.03) 0.28 (0.14)
    -Fraction with academic degree 0.53 0.42 0.52 0.29 -0.24 (0.01) 0.10 (0.04)
    -Years in university 2.82 2.33 2.86 1.58 -1.24 (0.04) 0.53 (0.19)
    -Years in post-secondary 1.15 1.31 1.07 1.54 0.39 (0.02) -0.24 (0.10)
Womens' Education
SS-AA SA-AS
AA AS SA SS Gap (S.E) Gap (S.E)
Variables and Data Source (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Panel C: Fertility and Religious Practices^^^^
source: religious practice data is take from the LHSIM (N=1,1128)
Number of own children is taken from the Israeli Census of 1995
-Index of father's religious practices 0.43 0.58 0.52 0.79 0.37 (0.02) -0.07 (0.09)
-Index of mother religious practices 0.41 0.56 0.43 0.71 0.30 (0.02) -0.13 (0.08)
-Index of own religious practices 0.36 0.49 0.35 0.55 0.19 (0.02) -0.14 (0.09)
-Number of own children 2.05 2.00 1.92 2.24 0.18 (0.02) -0.09 (0.06)
Panel D: Occupations, Sectors and Work Status
Source: Israeli Census of 1995.
Occupations                                      
(1-Digit Classification)
Average Hourly 





Hourly wage of AA workers (in 1995) in each occupation
weighted by the fraction of each origin in occupation 13.123 12.078 13.289 11.450 -1.673 (0.045) 1.211 (0.238)
Managers $20 0.115 0.085 0.181 0.067 -0.049 (0.005) 0.095 (0.020)
Academic professionals $18 0.153 0.060 0.084 0.016 -0.136 (0.005) 0.024 (0.015)
Other free professionals $14 0.094 0.065 0.099 0.047 -0.048 (0.004) 0.034 (0.016)
and technicians
Clerks $13 0.114 0.140 0.110 0.131 0.016 (0.005) -0.030 (0.018)
Service workers $11 0.043 0.069 0.051 0.120 0.077 (0.004) -0.018 (0.013)
Sales, agents $11 0.069 0.078 0.097 0.088 0.020 (0.004) 0.019 (0.016)
Skilled workers in manufacturing, $10 0.350 0.429 0.291 0.406 0.056 (0.008) -0.138 (0.027)
transportation and construction
Farm workers $10 0.020 0.032 0.057 0.057 0.037 (0.003) 0.025 (0.012)
Unskilled workers in manufacturing    $8 0.041 0.042 0.030 0.068 0.026 (0.004) -0.012 (0.010)
Own Occupation
Hourly wage of AA workers in each occupation
weighted by the fraction of each origin in occupation 15.018 13.552 13.604 12.013 -3.00 (0.055) 0.053 (0.262)
Managers $20 0.209 0.142 0.164 0.076 -0.134 (0.005) 0.021 (0.026)
Academic professionals $18 0.210 0.122 0.116 0.052 -0.158 (0.005) -0.006 (0.023)
Associate professionals $14 0.114 0.117 0.106 0.077 -0.037 (0.004) -0.011 (0.023)
and technicians
Clerical workers $13 0.133 0.148 0.133 0.137 0.004 (0.005) -0.015 (0.025)
SS-AA SA-AS
AA AS SA SS Gap (S.E) Gap (S.E)
Variables and Data Source (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Panel D Cont.
Agents, sales and service workers $11 0.086 0.133 0.140 0.123 0.036 (0.005) 0.007 (0.025)
Manufacturing, construction $10 0.160 0.254 0.276 0.416 0.256 (0.006) 0.023 (0.032)
and other skilled workers
Skilled agricultural workers $10 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.005 (0.001) 0.001 (0.006)
Unskilled workers $8 0.017 0.031 0.024 0.057 0.040 (0.003) -0.007 (0.012)
Missing occupation -- 0.066 0.047 0.034 0.054 -0.013 (0.004) -0.013 (0.014)
Sector and Work Status
Fraction working 0.791 0.768 0.772 0.714 -0.076 (0.004) 0.005 (0.019)
Monthly hours working (If working) 215 213 217 209 -5.895 (0.639) 3.662 (3.229)
Government sector -- 0.285 0.245 0.246 0.254 -0.031 (0.007) 0.001 (0.031)
Salaried workers -- 0.782 0.767 0.756 0.772 -0.010 (0.005) -0.011 (0.023)
Self employed -- 0.205 0.219 0.235 0.221 0.016 (0.005) 0.016 (0.022)
Notes:
^To proxy family background we generate "synthetic" parents assuming mothers were 20 to 35 when they gave birth. For example a
"synthetic mother" of a person aged 35 in 1995 has the characteristics of the average married woman born in 1925-40 in terms of her
continent of origin and her spouse's origin. The "synthetic fathers" have the characteristics of those actually married to the “synthetic
mothers".
^^ The Socioeconomic Index was constructed by The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and is based on measures of income per
capita, unemployment rates, fraction of students with matriculation eligibility, fraction of college students, transportation, demography
and other measures for each locality.  
^^^Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale: A method for classifyng skin color. We used the skin color for each country to merge each
individual with the skin color of of his parents' country of birth.  
^^^^The index is the the sum of five indicator varibles receiving '1` if the person reports he/his father observed this religious practice.
The five practices are: wear Kippah, Does not eat bread on Passover, eats Kosher food, fasts on Yom Kippur r and Lays Tfillin. Yom
Kippu is the holiest day of the year for religious Jews. Its central themes are atonement and repentance. Jews traditionally observe this
holy day with fasting and intensive prayer, often spending most of the day in synagogue services. Kippah (or yarmulke) is a thin rounded
skullcap traditionally worn at all times by observant Jewish men. Tfilin is phylacteries. Unique measures for mothers include "covered
her hair" and "went to the Mikve". Mikve is a bath used for the purpose of ritual immersion.
^^^^^ For each occupation we calculated the average hourly wage of an AA worker. Hourly wage is presented in current US Dollars ($)
and was converted from New Israeli Shekels (NIS) by a rate of 3.04, the average exchange rate in September 1995 (Source: Bank of
Israel)    
1(SD) 0.5(SD) 0.5(SD) 1(SD)
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Father born in Asia/Africa SA -0.070 -0.078 -0.117 -0.122 -0.143 -0.099 -0.077
Mother born in Europe/America (0.042) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.051) (0.118)
Father born in Europe/America AA 0.272 0.065 0.017 -0.014 -0.112 0.041 0.099
Mother born in Europe/America (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.112) (0.032) (0.085)
Father born in Asia/Africa SS -0.186 -0.067 -0.063 -0.066 -0.075 -0.041 -0.016
Mother born in Asia/Africa (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.085)
Controlling for
   Education & Experience No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Occupation, Industry & Location No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared       0.14 0.34 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.52
Observations 18659 18659 18659 10801 4111 14548 7858
AET(2005) Multiplier^ N.A -3.028 -1.663 -1.946 -1.615 -1.010 -0.923
( ) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
Table 2
Log Hourly Wage Gaps by Father’s and Mother’s Origin, Males
Notes: The population sample is taken from the 1995 Israeli census and consists of Israeli-born Jewish males, full-time full-year salaried
workers, ages 30-55. The benchmark group consists of Israeli-born men with European/American-born fathers and Asian/African-born
mothers. The first column reports crude wage gaps, the second column reports wage gaps conditional on potential experience and highest
diploma received, and the third column in addition controls for a full set of dummy variables for each occupation and industry and each
area of residence. We add a dummy variable indicating a missing occupation/industry. Potential experience is calculated as [age]-[school
years completed]-[6] and we control for a quartic in potential experience. Highest diploma received is represented by 8 dummy variables.
We control for a full set of dummy variables for each area of residence in the year of the census. We define “full-time full-year” as
working at least 35 hours per week and 12 months a year.
^The AET multiplier, following the methodology in Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), indicates how much larger the normalized shift in
observables has to be relative to the normalized shift in the distribution of unobservables to explain away the SA effect.
^^Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale: A method for classifyng skin color. We used the skin color for each country to merge each individual
with the skin color of of his parents' country of birth.  
Score on Standardized 
Van Luschan Chromatic 
Scale^^ Is Within  a 
Band Of
Score on Standardized 
Van Luschan Chromatic 
Scale^^ Is Outside  a 
Band Of
All Women: By Marital Status:
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Father born in Asia/Africa SA -0.009 -0.032 -0.003 -0.004 0.016 -0.067 -0.248
Mother born in Europe/America (0.047) (0.041) (0.036) (0.049) (0.037) (0.164) (0.146)
Father born in Europe/America AA 0.143 -0.014 -0.025 0.142 -0.025 0.157 -0.085
Mother born in Europe/America (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026) (0.082) (0.079)
Father born in Asia/Africa SS -0.213 -0.106 -0.070 -0.223 -0.071 -0.128 -0.125
Mother born in Asia/Africa (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.081) (0.081)
Controlling for
   Education & Experience No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
   Occupation, Industry & Location No No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared       0.09 0.27 0.50 0.10 0.51 0.06 0.58
Observations 10725 10725 10725 9586 9586 1139 1139
( ) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
Ever Married Never  Married
Table 3
Log Hourly Wage Gaps by Father’s and Mother’s Origin, Females
Notes: The population sample is taken from the 1995 Israeli census and consists of Israeli-born Jewish females, full-time full-year
salaried workers, ages 30-55. The benchmark group consists of Israeli-born men with European/American-born fathers and
Asian/African-born mothers. In the first panel: the first column reports crude wage gaps, the second column reports wage gaps
conditional on potential experience and highest diploma received, and the third column in addition controls for a full set of dummy
variables for each occupation and industry and each area of residence. In the second panel: we estimate wage gaps by marital status
while ommiting the specification of the second column from the first panel. We add a dummy variable indicating a missing
occupation/industry. Potential experience is calculated as [age]-[school years completed]-[6] and we control for a quartic in potential
experience. Highest diploma received is represented by 8 dummy variables. We control for a full set of dummy variables for each area of
residence in the year of the census. We define “full-time full-year” as working at least 35 hours per week and 12 months a year.
All
Yes No
Panel A: All Married Women (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)             
Father born in Europe/America HWSA -0.053 -0.050 -0.059 -0.007
Father-in-Law born in Asia/Africa (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.040)
Father born in Europe/America HWAA 0.059 0.025 0.033 0.050
Father-in-Law born in Europe/America (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037)
Father born in Asia/Africa HWSS -0.125 -0.073 -0.070 -0.080
Father-in-Law born in Asia/Africa (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.033)
Mother Sephardic 0.001 -0.008 0.005 N/A
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Controlling for
   Education & Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Occupation, Industry & Location No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared       0.295 0.535 0.542 0.569
Observations 7093 7093 4305 2788
Panel B: Only Married Women From AS or SA Origin
Husband From Sephardic Origin -0.116 -0.084 -0.100 0.002
(0.082) (0.049) (0.053) (0.136)
Mother Sephardic -0.086 0.056 0.083 -0.227
(0.081) (0.049) (0.054) (0.153)
Controlling for
   Education & Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Occupation, Industry & Location Yes No No No
R-squared       0.803 0.292 0.314 0.574
Observations 333 333 284 49
Table 4
Log Hourly Wage Gaps by Father’s and Father-in-Law's Origin, Females
Notes: The population sample is taken from the 1995 Israeli census and consists of Israeli-born Jewish females, full-time full-
year salaried workers ages 30-55. Panel B is restricted only to women from AS or SA origin. We consider women whose father-
in-law’s origin is known. The benchmark group in the top panel consists of Israeli-born women with Asian/African-born fathers
and European/American-born father-in-laws (HWAS). The benchmark group in the bottom panel consists of Israeli-born women
with Asian/African-born father-in-laws. In each panel the first column reports wage gaps conditional on potential experience and 
highest diploma received and the and the second column in addition controls for a full set of dummy variables for each
occupation and industry and each area of residence. 
Score on Standardized Van 
Luschan Chromatic Scale^^  is 
Within 1 Standard Deviation
( ) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
Notes for Table 4 Continued: We add a dummy variable indicating a missing occupation/industry. Potential experience is
calculated as [age]-[school years completed]-[6] and we control for a quartic in potential experience. Highest diploma received
is represented by 8 dummy variables. We control for a full set of dummy variables for each area of residence in the year of the
census. We define “full-time full-year” as working at least 35 hours per week and 12 months a year. In the third and fourth
column of each panel we estimate the specification of the second column dividing the sample into two sub-samples. In column
(iii) we limit the sample to persons with values of the standardized Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale between 1 and -1. In column
(iv) we limit the sample to persons with values of the standardized Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale that are smaller than -1 or
greater than +1
^Von Luschan's Chromatic Scale: A method for classifyng skin color. We used the skin color for each country to merge each
individual with the skin color of of her parents' country of birth.  
Variables (i) (ii)
Change in Perceived Ethnicity^ -0.16
(0.09)
Change in Perceived Ethnicity -0.09
Between 1983 and 1995 from A to S (0.15)
Change in Perceived Ethnicity 0.19
Between 1983 and 1995 from S to A (0.11)
R-squared       0.17 0.17
Observations 244 244
( ) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
Table 5
 The Effect of a Change in Perceived Ethnicity on Log Hourly Wages, Females
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the change in log hourly wages between 1983 and 1995. 
The population sample is taken from the 1983-1995 linked Israeli census file and consists of Israeli-
born Jewish, salaried working women, ages 18-39 in 1983, who were single in 1983 and married
between 1983 and 1995. In the first column the benchmark group consists of women whose observed
ethnicity did not change between 1983 and 1995. In the second column the benchmark consists of
women who did not change their observed ethnicity (married a man of their own father’s ethnic group).
Control variables included in both columns are potential experience quartic, interactions between
potential experience and an indicator for father from Africa/Asia (isr_asaf), indicators for working
FTFY in 1983 or in 1995 and dummies for school years completed.
^ The variable "changed ethnicity" gets the value: (-1) if the woman's observed ethnicity changed from
Sephardic in 1983 to Ashkenazi in 1995, (1) if the woman’s ethnicity changed from Ashkenazi 1983 to
Sephardic in 1995 and (0) if the woman's observed ethnicity did not change between 1983 and 1995.
All Individuals (N=43,619) FTFY Sample (N=18,659)
AA^^ AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Distribution
Fractions 0.38 0.03 0.02 0.58 0.42 0.03 0.02 0.53
Numbers 16444 1289 710 25176 7842 548 293 9976
Marital status
Married 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.91
Divorced 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
Widowed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07
Education^
School Years Completed 14.1 12.9 12.9 11.6 14.4 13.1 12.9 11.8
HSD_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HSD_1_4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HSD_5_8 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09
HSD_9_11 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.20
HSG 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.20 0.31 0.33 0.37
HSGBAG 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.10
POSTSEC 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.14
BA 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.07
AD 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.02
^ HSD=High school dropout (number suffix represents school years completed) , HSG=High school graduate certificate,
HSGBAG=High school graduate with a matriculation certificate POSTSEC=Postsecondary education  BA=College graduate, AD=Advanced degree
^^ AA - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Europe/America; AS - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Asia/Africa
SS - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Asia/Africa; SA - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Europe/America 
Table A1
Sample Averages for Males Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
All Individuals (N=43,619) FTFY Sample (N=18,659)
AA AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Labor Market
Worked 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FTFY 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Self Employed 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Salaried 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Other^ 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.25
Potential Experience 22.7 18.6 20.3 20.1 22.2 18.1 20.5 19.8
Log of Hourly Earnings ------ ------ ------ ------ 3.65 3.38 3.31 3.19
Occupations
Academic Professionals 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.05
Associate Professionals 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.08
and Technicians
Managers 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.16 0.08
Clerical Workers 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14
Agents, Sales Workers 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.12
and Service Workers
Skilled Agricultural 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Industry, Construction and 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.16 0.25 0.28 0.42
Other Skilled Workers
Unskilled 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06
Missing Occupation^^ 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05
^ Individuals who were not self employed or salaried workers worked in a cooperative, kibbutz or as unpaid family members
^^ Individual did not work or occupation is either not reported or reported with an error
Sample Averages for Males Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
All Individuals (N=43,619) FTFY Sample (N=18,659)
AA AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Locality in 1995
Three Major Cities 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.17
Jerusalem 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.07
Tel Aviv 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07
Haifa 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.03
Localities  2-199K 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.83
100-199K 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.33 0.31
20-100K 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.37
2 -20k 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.16
Rural areas 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 ------ ------ ------ ------
Moshav 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 ------ ------ ------ ------
Kibbutz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ------ ------ ------ ------
Other 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 ------ ------ ------ ------
Sample Averages for Males Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
All Individuals (N=45,351) FTFY Sample (N=10,725)
AA^^ AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Distribution
Fractions 0.37 0.03 0.02 0.59 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.57
Numbers 16799 1251 732 26569 4137 338 181 6069
Marital status
Married 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.80
Divorced 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09
Widowed 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01
Single 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10
Education^
School Years Completed 14.2 13.1 13.3 11.9 14.2 13.1 13.2 12.0
HSD_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HSD_1_4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HSD_5_8 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06
HSD_9_11 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.14
HSG 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.38
HSGBAG 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.22
POSTSEC 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.12
BA 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.07
AD 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.01
^ HSD=High school dropout (number suffix represents school years completed) , HSG=High school graduate certificate,
HSGBAG=High school graduate with a matriculation certificate POSTSEC=Postsecondary education  BA=College graduate, AD=Advanced degree
^^ AA - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Europe/America; AS - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Asia/Africa
SS - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Asia/Africa; SA - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Europe/America 
Table A2
Sample Averages for Females Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
All Individuals (N=45,351) FTFY Sample (N=10,725)
AA AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Labor Market
Worked 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FTFY 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Self Employed 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Salaried 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Other^ 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.44
Potential Experience 21.2 18.3 18.6 19.4 22.7 18.6 19.7 19.8
Log of Hourly Earnings ------ ------ ------ ------ 3.35 3.20 3.19 2.99
Occupations
Academic Professionals 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.03
Associate Professionals 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.08
and Technicians
Managers 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03
Clerical Workers 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.43 0.51 0.47 0.56
Agents, Sales Workers 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16
and Service Workers
Skilled Agricultural 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry, Construction and 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05
Other Skilled Workers
Unskilled 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
Missing Occupation^^ 0.31 0.36 0.32 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04
^ Individuals who were not self employed or salaried workers worked in a cooperative, kibbutz or as unpaid family members
^^ Individual did not work or occupation is either not reported or reported with an error
Sample Averages for Females Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
All Individuals (N=45,351) FTFY Sample (N=10,725)
AA AS SA SS AA AS SA SS
Locality in 1995
Three Major Cities 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.21
Jerusalem 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10
Tel Aviv 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08
Haifa 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.04
Localities  2-199K 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.79
100-199K 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.32
20-100K 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.33
2 -20k 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.14
Rural areas 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 ------ ------ ------ ------
Moshav 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 ------ ------ ------ ------
Kibbutz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ------ ------ ------ ------
Other 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 ------ ------ ------ ------
Sample Averages for Females Born in Israel to Parents of Mixed Origin, Ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census
Origin by Parents' Continent of Birth
Data Set and Source AA^ AS SA SS
Parents-Offspring 
Source: 1983 census
Number of Observations 41552 6296 3736 135656
Father's Age 44.4 40.7 37.1 41.8
Father's Years of schooling 10.5 9.1 10.2 6.0
Father's Matriculation 0.33 0.18 0.31 0.07
Father's Academic degree 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.01
Father's log hourly wages 1.64 1.46 1.52 1.25
Mother's Age 39.4 35.6 32.7 36.6
Mother's Years of schooling 10.1 8.3 9.8 4.6
Mother's Matriculation 0.31 0.15 0.27 0.04
Mother's Academic degree 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00
Mother's log hourly wages 1.36 1.16 1.29 0.86
Offspring's Age 10.4 8.2 6.8 8.9
Number of Siblings 2.1 2.9 2.6 4.4
"Synthetic" Parents  
Source: 1983 census
Number of observations 37568 3400 2010 40840
Father's Age 55.7 51.8 50.0 52.0
Father's Years of schooling 10.8 9.9 11.1 7.1
Father's Matriculation 0.34 0.23 0.37 0.09
Father's Academic degree 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.02
Father's log hourly wages 5.22 5.12 5.28 4.88
Mother's Age 52.0 47.5 46.6 47.6
Mother's Years of schooling 10.4 9.2 10.8 5.5
Mother's Matriculation 0.33 0.18 0.36 0.06
Mother's Academic degree 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.01
Mother's log hourly wages 4.84 4.80 4.94 4.49
Table A3
Sample Averages
Offspring-Parents File, “Synthetic” Parents File and the LHSIM Data
^ AA - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Europe/America; AS - Father born in Europe/America and 
Mother born in Asia/Africa; SS - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Asia/Africa; SA - Father born in 
Asia/Africa and Mother born in Europe/America 
Origin by Parents' Continent of Birth
Data Set and Source AA AS SA SS
Life History Study of Israeli Men
Number of Observations 430 27 17 667
School Years Completed 13.0 11.7 12.2 11.0
I.D.F Analytical Test Scores 22.18 19.81 22.47 19.12
I.D.F Verbal Test Scores 13.61 11.00 12.65 10.11
Wears "kippa" 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.13
Fasts on "Yom Kippur" 0.52 0.72 0.59 0.86
Father Wears "kippa" 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.55
Father Fasted on "Yom Kippur" 0.58 0.77 0.76 0.98
^ AA - Father born in Europe/America and Mother born in Europe/America; AS - Father born in Europe/America and 
Mother born in Asia/Africa; SS - Father born in Asia/Africa and Mother born in Asia/Africa; SA - Father born in 
Asia/Africa and Mother born in Europe/America 
Table A3 Continued
Figure 1 
The Israeli-Born Jewish Population, Ages 22-65, by Parents’ Continent of Birth, Israel 1995 
The data is taken from the 1995 Census and includes the entire Jewish population and recent immigrants. The figure divides the 
Israeli-born Jewish population, ages 22-65 in 1995, into three sub populations by parents' origin: (i) both parents born outside Israel 
(71%) (ii) one parent born in Israel  (13%) and (iii) both parents born in Israel. (16%) Those whose parents were born outside of Israel 
are further classified into four groups by parents' continent of birth. Parents classified as Ashkenazi were born in Europe, America, 
Australia or New-Zealand. Parents classified as  Sephardic were born in Asia or Africa. The two groups AS and SA are the focus of 
this paper: they contain about 4% of all Israeli-born Jews ages 22-65 in 1995.  
.  
Both Father and Mother Ashkenazi  (AA) - 25% 
Both Father and Mother Sephardic (SS) - 42% 
Both Parents Born in Israel - 16% 
One Parent Born in Israel - 
13% 
Ashkenazi Father and Sephardic Mother (AS) - 2% 

































































Analytic Test Scores 
Verbal Test Scores 
Father's Matriculation 
Mother's Matriculation 
Father's Log of Hourly Wage 
Mother's Lof of Hourly Wage 
B.A and Advanced Degree 
HSG + Matriculation Certificate 
Highschool Graduates 
School Years Completed 
Figure 2 
Wages, Home Environments and Scholastic Achievement, by Father’s and Mother’s Origin,   
Israeli-Born, Jewish Males, ages 30-55, the 1995 Israeli Census     
The figure shows: (i) educational outcomes (source: 1995 Israeli census), IDF analytical and verbal standardized test 
scores (source: LHSIM) and hourly wage gaps (wage sample: full time full year, salaried workers, 1995 Israeli census) 
and (ii) educational outcomes and hourly wage gaps for parents to Israeli-born Jewish males who were ages 1-18 in 1972 
(source: Offspring-Parents file) . The benchmark group consists of Israeli-born Jewish men with European/American-born 
fathers and Asian/African-born mothers (AS).   
Own Residual of Log Hourly Wage 






















College Graduates (BA and Advanced Degree) 
Husbands: College Graduates (BA and Advanced Degree) 
Husbands: Wage Residual 
Hourly Wage Residual 
Figure 3 
The Gaps in Educational Attainment and Wages Between Married Women and Between their Husbands 
by Father’s and Father-in-Law’s Origin 
The population sample is taken from the 1995 Israeli census. The figure shows the gaps in log hourly wages and fraction with college 
education or advanced degree between groups of Israeli-born Jewish women ages 30-55 in 1995 (solid and horizontally striped bars, 
respectively) and between their husbands (checkered and vertically striped bars, respectively). Women are classified into four groups by 
father's and father-in-law's continent of birth.  The benchmark group consists of Israeli-born women with Asian/African-born fathers and 
European/American-born father-in-laws (HWAS).  
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